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Abstract 
Microenterprises receive several forms of aid; however, many are denied access to 
formal finance. It is often argued that women entrepreneurs are frequently discriminated 
against in formal credit markets, but these arguments are often based on . rhetoric and 
advocacy rather than rigorous analysis. In this study, the results of a multinomial logit 
model show that although a smaller total number of women than men entrepreneurs applied 
for loans, women entrepreneurs represent a higher proportion of applicants. Interestingly, 
the small probabilities of both male and female entrepreneurs being quantity rationed 
implies that this form of credit rationing is not widely exercised in special microenterprise 
programs in Ecuador. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Microenterprises are an important source of livelihood for many people in developing 
countries. A large literature discusses the development of micro and small scale businesses 
and the most appropriate ways to assist them (Levitsky; Liedholm and Mead; Meyer; Steel 
and Webster; Webster). Access to financial services, and especially to loans, is often identi-
fled as one of the most important constraints reported by microentrepreneurs when initiating 
or expanding their businesses (Levitsky; Liedholm and Mead; Meyer). Microentrepreneurs 
are widely perceived to be rationed in credit markets because formal financial institutions 
prefer to work with larger and less risky customers (Chang et al.; Little et al.). 
It is often argued that women represent one group of persons frequently discrimi-
nated against in formal credit markets in developing countries (Buvinic et al; Due and 
Summary; F AO; Lycette; McKee; Otero and Downing). In her assessment of credit as the 
missing piece in microenterprise development, McKee emphasized the gender based credit 
constraints which exacerbated the problems women face when operating microenterprises. 
Otero and Downing concluded: 'The formal financial system, for the most part, has been 
1 We acknowledge with appreciation the work of John Magill and his colleagues at DAI 
and INSOTEC in collecting and permitting us to use the primary data on which this study 
is based. 
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unable to respond to women's financial needs." (1989: 5). They argue that some of the 
major factors that limit women's participation are: " ... related to institutional requirements, 
others to cultural and social norms, and still others to the type of productive activities in 
which women predominate. (1989:5)." Buvinic et al. discuss that there are: " ... two major 
factors which restrict women's access to formal credit more than men's. These are related 
to women's lack of control over economic resources and the nature of their economic acti-
vity. (1979:9)." Due and Summary summarize that: "It is well known that Africans (both 
male and female) have not been able to obtain capital from the formal sources for 
agricultural inputs. (1979:15)." 
A F AO study on the promotion of women's activities in marketing and credit 
explored whether or not banks view women as bankable. Banks with limited experience in 
working with women may perceive that female entrepreneurs do not represent the best 
customers to make profits and reduce costs, but some banks are adjusting their practices to 
reach more women. The study reveals that from the women's point of view, the majority 
of banks in developing countries are not satisfactory sources of finance for a number of 
reasons. These reasons include the time involved to process loan applications, inconvenient 
bank working hours, requirements for guarantors and the high margin charged on loans. 
However, the reasons presented in the study are not only pertinent to women but to many 
poor people in developing countries. In another attempt to evaluate women's access to 
credit, Lycette concluded in her study that there is little direct evidence of women's limited 
access to credit. The author argues that it is hard to carefully analyze the problem because 
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many formal financial institutions do not keep records of financial transactions by gender 
since women are such a small proportion of their clients. 
The perception that formal financial institutions discriminate against women is also 
pervasive in developed countries. A large literature treats the issue of bank discrimination 
against female business owners in western countries, but the measurement of discrimination 
is largely based on subjective perceptions and lacks statistical evidence (Hisrich and Brush; 
Kryzanowski and Bertin-Boussu; Stevenson). 
The evidence presented in the literature that purports to show limited access to credit 
by women is often interpreted too easily as a loan supply side problem; rarely is any thought 
given to the possibility that borrowing patterns may also be explained by a lack of loan 
demand by female entrepreneurs. The arguments presented regarding women's access to 
credit are often based on rhetoric and advocacy rather than on rigorous analysis. A recent 
exception is a study which analyzed sex differences in acquiring access to a Peruvian deve-
lopment fund (Buvinic and Berger). The empirical data presented imply that the reason few 
women participated in the program was due more to the fact that there were few women 
applicants rather than to a more frequent rejection of women applicants than men. The 
study concluded that there did not appear to be outright lender discrimination against 
female borrowers in Peru. 
The present study aims to separate rhetoric from reality by carefully investigating the 
issue of discrimination against women in Ecuadorian credit markets. This analysis is con-
ducted by, first, exploring the distribution of applicants and non-applicants for formal credit 
among men and women microentrepreneurs and, second, measuring the degree of success 
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they have in obtaining the size of loan requested. An econometric model is tested to exam-
ine the distribution of loan applications and explore if discrimination, in the form of 
rejecting or rationing female entrepreneurs, exists in the observed patterns of loan 
allocation. 
The paper is presented in six sections. The next section discusses the credit rationing 
phenomenon. The following section describes microenterprises in Ecuador and the survey 
which provided the data used in this study. The fourth section describes the model used for 
explaining microentrepreneurial borrowing behavior and the incidence and intensity of credit 
rationing employed by formal lenders. The results and implications are discussed in section 
five, and the last section presents the conclusions of the study. 
2. CREDIT RATIONING 
Credit rationing can be interpreted as a form of discrimination against particular 
types and classes of borrowers that occurs as a result of asymmetric information problems 
that lenders confront when they are unable to distinguish creditworthy from non-creditwo-
rthy customers (Bester; Jaffee and Russell; Stiglitz and Weiss). A lack of understanding of 
this problem has led many critics to unfairly blame formal lenders for arbitrarily discrimi-
nating against certain classes of borrowers such as small business men and women. 
The problem is that lenders face problems of asymmetric information when trying 
to sort loan applicants. Financial contracts involve default risk because of adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems associated with the borrower's indeterminate type and 
unpredictable action (Stiglitz and Weiss). Even in the absence of interest rate ceilings, 
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imperfect information generates an equilibrium in credit markets where interest rates are 
inadequate to clear the market demand for loans(Bester, Jaffee and Russell). To resolve 
asymmetric information problems and to identify creditworthy borrowers, lenders utilize 
non-price mechanisms to ration loans based upon the attributes of the entrepreneurs and 
the characteristics of enterprises (Aguilera and Graham; Lapar and Graham). A complete 
analysis of possible discrimination in a credit market requires analyzing both internal self-
selection and external credit rationing to determine if the distribution of borrowers and the 
amount borrowed differs among different subsets of loan applicants. The fact that one class 
of customers obtains more or less loans than another can be attributed to simple 
discrimination or to more complex issues of credit rationing. 
Internal self-selection occurs when a group of potential loan applicants self-select 
themselves and decide to not even apply for a loan. Two reasons may explain this behavior. 
One implies that the decision is based on true self-selection where potential applicants do 
not apply because they do not have a true demand for external finance although they may 
report a "need" for credit when asked. The second reason implies that the decision is a 
result of induced self-selection where potential applicants do not apply for loans because 
they perceive they will be rejected. 
Self-selection based on the belief that loan applications will be rejected may reflect 
a correct assessment because these applicants do not possess the attributes (income, 
collateral, etc.) required by lenders. These attributes signify barriers to access to formal 
credit markets for some potential applicants. Alternatively, these potential applicants may 
have incorrectly concluded that their applications would have been rejected when in fact 
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they would have been approved. While internal self-selection cannot be easily quantified, 
it probably explains the behavior of many women, small farmers, microentrepreneurs and 
poor people who rely heavily on the informal sector for their financial services. 
On the other hand, there are two types of external credit rationing - loan-quantity 
and loan-size rationing - that exist when suppliers decide to allocate loans selectively in 
credit markets. Loan-quantity rationing occurs when lenders grant loans to a group of appli-
cants who are identified as creditworthy borrowers, while rejecting another group as non-
creditworthy. Loan-size rationing occurs when some borrowers receive loans in amounts at 
least as large as demanded, while others receive amounts less than demanded (Aguilera). 
To test for discrimination, therefore, it is first an issue of examining whether women 
face more barriers than men to entering credit markets and, therefore, are largely 
concentrated in the non-applicants group. Second, if discrimination occurs it is important 
to determine if women who apply for loans are more quantity or size rationed than their 
male counterparts. 
This paper analyzes internal self-selection, loan-quantity and loan-size rationing in 
a sample of microentrepreneurs in Ecuador. This survey was not designed to reveal the 
reasons explaining internal self-selection; however, the data allow us to examine the 
significant variables associated with the likelihood of the entrepreneurs to exercise self-
selection or to be rationed. 
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3. THE MICROENTERPRISE SURVEY 
Although the data are sketchy, the importance of microenterprises appear to have 
increased in Ecuador in recent years. A sharp decline in the 1980s in the share of labor 
income contributed to the increased prevalence of self-employed workers and microenterpr-
ises (Chang, et al.). An assessment of microenterprises found that they play a key role in 
generating urban employment. Chang et al. reported that the microenterprise sector 
accounts for about two-thirds of the labor employed in the private sector; however, many 
microenterprises face both credit and technical assistance constraints. 
The analysis reported in this paper is based on a 1990 survey of micro and small scale 
enterprises in Ecuador. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 625 randomly 
selected entrepreneurs. A total of 601 entrepreneurs reported a complete set of information 
that could be used in this analysis. The sample is composed of two groups: 447 randomly 
selected beneficiaries of microenterprise programs and 154 non-beneficiaries or control 
entrepreneurs who were identified by the sampled beneficiaries as being similar types of 
entrepreneurs. The beneficiaries represent individuals who received assistance - credit, 
training or technical assistance - from a formal institutional program designed to provide 
services to micro and small enterprises (Magill et al.). The gender composition of both the 
beneficiary and control groups was identical, about 65 percent males and 35 percent females. 
Almost 99 percent of the respondents stated that they needed credit at the time of 
the survey in August 1990, but many had not requested loans from formal institutions during 
the year prior to the survey. Table 1 presents a classification of both the beneficiary and 
control entrepreneurs into 4 categories of applicant-borrowers. Category (1) includes 
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entrepreneurs subject to internal self-selection because they did not apply for formal loans 
even though they reported a need for credit; category (2) includes the quantity rationed 
group of applicants who applied for but were denied loans from formal institutions; category 
(3) includes the loan size rationed subgroup of unsatisfied borrowers who were granted 
loans smaller than the amounts demanded; and category ( 4) includes satisfied borrowers 
who were granted loans in amounts at least as large as demanded. 
The frequencies reported in Table 1 show large differences between the beneficiary 
and control groups in all four categories of respondents. Most members of the control 
group did not even apply for a loan, while only one-third of the beneficiaries did not apply. 
Participation in a microenterprise program, therefore, is clearly related to applying for a 
loan. This is an expected conclusion since many microenterprise programs exist in part to 
help microentrepreneurs learn how to complete loan applications and overcome barriers to 
access to formal credit markets. 
It was found that the beneficiary and control subgroups have approximately equal 
percentages of male and female participants in each of the four categories of applicant-
borrowers. Thus, interestingly, there exist differences between the beneficiary and control 
groups, particularly concerning self-selection; however, there are no gender differences 
between the two groups and among the four categories. 
The sample is composed mostly of enterprises (83 percent) with five or less 
employees. They are divided almost equally between businesses located in the Sierra and 
the Coastal regions of the country. The majority of the respondents (93 percent) admitted 
to being risk-takers. A large subgroup of the sample (84 percent) were customers of a 
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formal financial institution as holders of checking or deposit accounts. The majority of 
microentrepreneurs were concentrated in production (40 percent), services (28 percent), 
commerce (23 percent}, and only 7 percent in agriculture. Most of the entrepreneurs (79 
percent) established their own privately owned microenterprises, and about 67 percent had 
received training from a support institution. They are mostly heads of their families ( 64 
percent), and about 59 percent are high school graduates. 
4. THE MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL 
A multinomial logit model was developed to assess the importance of factors hypo-
thesized to explain the distribution of microentrepreneurs among the four categories of 
respondents described above. This model permits the use of a categorical dependent vari-
able. It is an extension of the traditional linear logit model that determines the probability 
of a particular event when faced with just two alternatives (Theil). In the multinomial logit 
case, there are a number of alternatives (N) that generate N probabilities. The objectives 
for using this econometric technique were twofold. The first was to test the relationships 
between the probabilities and the several hypothesized continuous and discrete determining 
factors. The second was to use the estimated coefficients to generate the probabilities of 
the microentrepreneurs falling into one of the four categories. 
The model tested consists of four probabilities, Pj G = 1, ... ,4 }, associated with the four 
categories of microentrepreneurs. The probability of being a non-applicant is P1, the 
probability of being loan-quantity rationed is P 2' the probability of being loan-size rationed 
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is P 3' and the probability of being a satisfied borrower is P 4• The maximum likelihood 
technique, discussed by Maddala, was used to estimate the following equations: 
log.(:~). =a + '} pjkxii + "'ft 
where: 
j = 2,3,4 categories; 
i = l, ... ,n observations; 
a = intercept; 
f3 = coefficients; 
xk = 1, ... ,m explanatory variables; 
µ = error terms. 
The estimation procedure generates the coefficients of the probabilities of an observation 
falling into category 2,3 and 4 with respect to category 1. Alternative comparisons of other 
probabilities with different bases can be derived from: 
where j=3,4, and h=2,3, with j not equal to h simultaneously, and by using: 
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The first set of estimated coefficients with respect to category 1 can be used to 
calculate the probabilities of microentrepreneurs being in each of the four categories of 
applicants-borrowers. 
The distribution of enterprises among the four categories of respondents is 
hypothesized to be explained by the two types of factors listed in Table 2. The first type 
refers to characteristics of the enterprise which include: size of business proxied by the value 
of business assets (ASST}; ownership structure of owner (OWNR) versus non-owner of the 
enterprise; establishing a new business (NWBS) versus operating an existing one; economic 
sector of operation being production (PRDC), commerce (CMRC), services (SRVC) or 
agriculture (AGRC); and region where the enterprise is located, (SIERRA) versus the coast. 
The second set of factors refers to the attributes of the entrepreneur which include: being 
a customer with a formal financial institution (CSTMR) by holding a deposit or checking 
account versus a non-customer; number of years operating the enterprise (YRS); reported 
type of entrepreneur being either a risk taker (RSKY) or risk averse; recipient of training 
(TRN) from a microenterprise project; age of the entrepreneur (AGE); high school graduate 
(EDUC) or not; head of the family (HOF) or not; sex of the entrepreneur (MALE) or· 
female. H women included in the sample are discriminated against in formal credit markets, 
it is expected that the coefficient for (MALE) would be significant and positive when 
assessing the probability of being borrowers in either category 3 or 4 with respect to being 
non-applicants, i.e. in category 1, or with respect to being rejected applicants in category 2. 
Also, the coefficient for male would be positive and significant when assessing the 
probability of being a satisfied borrower versus being a loan-size rationed borrower. 
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5. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The econometric results presented in Table 3 were generated utilizing maximum 
likelihood estimation and additional transformations using Suit's dummy variable interpreta-
tion technique. The results are subject to the limitations of the survey which gathered 
information only with respect to the year of 1989 and, thus, may not capture the long term 
borrowing behavior of these entrepreneurs. The coefficients of the probabilities of the 
respondents being quantity rationed, size rationed and satisfied borrowers are estimated with 
respect to being non-applicants. A positive coefficient implies that the probability of a 
respondent falling in the numerator category (quantity or size rationed or satisfied 
borrowers) is greater than the probability of falling in the denominator category (non-
applicant, quantity or size rationed borrower). For example, a positive coefficient for a 
variable in the first column implies that the respondent is more likely to be a quantity 
rationed applicant than a non-applicant. Conversely, a negative coefficient implies that the 
respondent is less likely to be a quantity rationed applicant than a non-applicant. 
Among the factors reflecting the importance of different enterprise characteristics in 
explaining credit behavior, owners (OWNR) of micro and small scale enterprises are more 
likely to be non-applicants than satisfied borrowers and are more likely to be quantity 
rationed than loan-size rationed borrowers. This finding implies that owners are more likely 
to self-finance their activities than to apply for or have access to loans. Microentrepreneurs 
who have established new businesses (NWBS) have a higher probability of being non-
applicants than being loan-size rationed borrowers. This result also implies that new 
businesses are more likely to be self financed than to draw on external finance. The 
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sectoral classification of the enterprise in production, commerce and services does not seem 
to have a significant impact on microentrepreneurial borrowing behavior. Only those 
microentrepreneurs with enterprises in agriculture have a higher probability of being . 
quantity rationed applicants than being non-applicants. Entrepreneurs located in the coastal 
region are more likely to be non-applicants than loan-size rationed borrowers. 
Among the factors reflecting the importance of the entrepreneurial attributes, the 
coefficient for (CSTMR) implies that clients holding checking or deposit accounts with 
financial institutions are more likely to be among the satisfied borrowers category than be 
among the non-applicants, quantity rationed or size rationed borrowers. This result is expec-
ted because bank customers reduce a considerable amount of the asymmetric information 
problems and consequent costs that lenders face when dealing with unfamiliar applicants. 
Experience of the entrepreneurs (YRS) implies that the more experienced entrepre-
neurs are more likely to be non-applicants or loan-size rationed borrowers than quantity 
rationed borrowers. As expected, risky applicants (RSKY) have a higher probability of 
being in the quantity rationed category than in being non-applicants or loan-size rationed 
category. Entrepreneurs who have received training (TRN) from a microenterprise program 
are more likely to be quantity rationed, loan-size rationed or satisfied borrowers than to be 
non-applicants. This may reflect a means to overcome the self selection decision because 
many entrepreneurs enter training programs precisely to learn how to apply for a loan. Age 
of the entrepreneurs does not seem to have a significant impact on microentrepreneurial 
borrowing behavior. 
14 
Surprisingly, educated microentrepreneurs (EDUC) have a higher probability of being 
loan-size rationed borrowers than being non-applicants, quantity rationed or satisfied 
borrowers. At the same time, educated microentrepreneurs are more likely to be non-
applicants than satisfied borrowers. Microentrepreneurs who are heads of families (HOF) 
have a higher probability of being loan-size rationed borrowers than being non-applicants, 
quantity rationed or satisfied borrowers. 
The coefficient for gender implies that male entrepreneurs have a higher probability 
of being non-applicants or quantity rationed borrowers than being size rationed borrowers. 
Female entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are more likely to be loan-size rationed borrowers 
than to be non-applicants or quantity rationed borrowers. These findings imply that 
discrimination against female applicants does not occur in the form of loan-quantity 
rationing but may occur in loan-size rationing. 
The multinomial logit model allows for the estimation of the probabilities of an 
observation being in each category of applicant-borrowers. This procedure involves using 
the estimated coefficients of the model for typical2 male and female microentrepreneurs 
to generate the probabilities for each type of entrepreneur. Gender and sector of operation 
are factors of particular importance that are often discussed concerning discrimination in 
credit markets. Table 4 presents the probabilities of an entrepreneur falling into one of the 
2 A "typical" microentrepreneur is assumed to be a risky owner of a newly established 
enterprise located in the Coastal region, who has received training, graduated from high 
school, is a customer with a financial institution and is the head of the family. This 
microentrepreneur is assigned to have the averages of 3836360 sucres worth of total assets 
(approximately 900 sucres = 1 US $), 6 years of experience in running the business, and 37 
years of age. 
15 
four categories for a typical male or female microentrepreneur operating in one of the four 
classified sectors. 
The findings indicate, first, that the largest probabilities for all types of entrepreneurs 
regardless of gender or sector are those in the non-applicants category followed by the loan 
size rationed borrowers. Second, there are small probabilities for the typical entrepreneurs 
to be satisfied borrowers and even smaller probabilities for being quantity rationed 
borrowers. 
A comparison made between the male and female probabilities using the Wilcoxon 
test indicates interesting observations (Siegel and Castellan). On the one hand, the typical 
female entrepreneurs have significantly lower probabilities for being non-applicants than 
male entrepreneurs (p < 0.05). This implies greater self-selection by male than female 
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the typical female entrepreneurs have significantly higher 
probabilities than males for being loan-size rationed borrowers (p < 0.05). Gender seems 
to have no significant impact on the probability of a typical entrepreneur falling in either 
the quantity rationed applicant category or the satisfied borrowers category. These findings 
imply that while women are less likely to be non-applicants and do not particularly 
experience loan-quantity rationing, they seem to be slightly more likely to be loan-size 
rationed borrowers than males. Therefore, if women have a problem in Ecuadorian credit 
programs, it appears to be more one of getting a smaller loan than desired rather than no 
loan at all. A significant problem existing in Ecuadorian markets, which seems to be more 
pronounced for men rather than for women, is manifested in the number of non-applicants 
to formal financial institutions. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper was to conduct an empirical examination of the issue of 
discrimination against women in formal credit markets. The case study of Ecuadorian credit 
markets was investigated by analyzing the distribution of loan applications for formal credit 
from men and women microentrepreneurs and exploring their success in gaining access to 
and obtaining the size of loan requested. An econometric model was tested to examine the 
distribution of loan applications and explore if discrimination against women seemed to 
occur in the process of loan allocation. A multinomial logit model was specified to analyze 
the probability of microentrepreneurs falling into the four categories of being non-
applicants, quantity rationed applicants, loan-size rationed or satisfied borrowers. 
The sample was composed of two groups: the beneficiary group which represents 
individuals who received assistance - credit, training or technical assistance - from a formal 
institutional program of assistance to micro and small scale enterprises; and the non-
beneficiary or control entrepreneurs who were identified by the sampled beneficiaries as 
similar types of entrepreneurs. Most members of the control group, both male and female, 
did not even apply for a loan, while only one-third of the beneficiaries did not apply. The 
multinomial logit model results imply that the typical female entrepreneurs have a slightly 
lower probability of exercising internal self selection, that is, being non-applicants than male 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, female entrepreneurs have a higher probability of being loan-size 
rationed borrowers rather than loan-quantity rationed borrowers. Interestingly, the small 
probabilities of both male and female entrepreneurs being quantity rationed implies that this 
form of rationing is not widely exercised among participants in special microenterprise 
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programs. Male entrepreneurs exhibit slightly higher probabilities for being satisfied 
borrowers than female entrepreneurs. 
In an attempt to clarify the nature of the gender issue, Buvinic and Berger showed 
that the low proportion of women receiving loans from a microenterprise program is due 
to the fact that few women applied for external finance. In our study, the results show that 
although a smaller total number of women than men entrepreneurs applied for loans, 
women represent a higher proportion of the entrepreneurs who applied for loans. Thus, the 
analysis presented in this paper has further shown that women entrepreneurs, although 
representing a smaller percentage of the overall sample, are more likely to be applicants and 
less likely to exercise internal self-selection than male entrepreneurs. Once women enter 
the market and initiate their business activities, they are as likely to borrow as their male 
counterparts. 
Contrary to popular beliefs, the results of this study provide evidence that disputes 
the popular notion that gender bias leads to a large proportion of female loan applicants 
being rejected for a loan. If gender bias existed, there would have been a larger probability 
of loan-quantity rationed female applicants than male applicants, but the results do not 
support this notion. Female entrepreneurs, however, seem to be subject to more loan-size 
rationing than their male counterparts. The reasons for this fact are not clear and can only 
be explained through a detailed analysis of lender operations. 
Much of the traditional research about women and finance has been too superficial. 
It assumed that the reported lower frequency of women borrowing from formal credit 
sources or the smaller loan size reported compared to men was solely the result of supply 
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side discrimination by lenders. Obviously discrimination may occur, but much of the 
traditional analysis ignores demand side behavior. The results presented in this paper show 
that the examination of gender discrimination requires going beyond the simple rhetoric 
found in many studies. The results show that female entrepreneurs in small businesses in 
Ecuador are more likely to apply for external finance than male entrepreneurs and they are 
equally likely to face loan-quantity rationing. 
The loan-size rationing reported in this study is a result of the inherent asymmetric 
information problems that exist in financial markets. H entrepreneurs hope to be successful 
in borrowing, they need to generate information that lenders find useful in making loan 
decisions. This is likely to be most difficult for those small, first-time borrowers who also 
have the most difficulty in getting commercial loans. Special programs, such as those that 
exist in Ecuador, may ease the credit constraints for some of these borrowers, but they do 
not resolve the entire rationing problem inherent in credit markets. 
Other studies have reported a small proportion of female relative to male borrowers 
in credit programs. This study lends support to the argument that much of the problem 
previously attributed to gender bias in the distribution of credit has deeper roots. Many of 
the credit problems that women face have their origin outside financial markets. Many 
relate to the traditional, cultural and legal constraints that deter women from joining the 
mainstream labor force or becoming active and growing entrepreneurs. Further research 
is needed into these fundamental issues that influence entrepreneurial behavior and self-
selection in the credit markets. These problems cannot be resolved by interventions into 
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financial markets such as setting quotas for women borrowers or trying in other ways to 
force lenders to make more loans or larger loans to women. 
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TABLE 1. 
DISTRIBUTION OF ENTREPRENEURS 
SAMPLE BENEFICIARIES CONTROL 
CATEGORY 
Non-Applicants 
Rejected Applicants 
Unsatisfied Borrowers 
Satisfied Borrowers 
Total 
No. 
145 
31 
137 
84 
447 
PERCENT 
32.4 
18.1 
30.6 
18.8 
100 
TABLE 2. 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Characteristics of the Enterprises 
ASST Value of total assets in sucres. 
Dummy = 1 for owner of an enterprise. 
Dummy = 1 for a new business. 
Dummy = 1 for a production enterprise. 
Dummy = 1 for a commercial enterprise. 
Dummy = 1 for a services enterprise. 
Dummy = 1 for an agricultural enterprise. 
No. 
123 
16 
9 
6 
154 
OWNR 
NWBS 
PRDC 
CMRC 
SRVC 
AGR 
COAST Dummy = 1 for an enterprise in the Coastal region. 
Characteristics of the Entrepreneurs 
CSTMR Dummy = 1 for customers holding checking accounts. 
YRS No. of years operating the business. 
RSKY Dummy = 1 for a reported risk-taker microentrepreneur. 
TRN Dummy = 1 for receiving training from a microenterprise 
AGE 
EDUC 
HOF 
MALE 
program. 
No of years of age. 
Dummy = 1 for graduating from high school. 
Dummy = 1 for head of the family. 
Dummy = 1 for males. 
PERCENT 
79.8 
10.4 
5.9 
3.9 
100 
• 
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TABLE 3. 
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL COEFFICIENT ESTIMA1ES 
Dependent Variable (in Natural Logarithm) 
Independent (P2/Pl) (P3/Pl) (P4/Pl) (P3/P2) (P4/P2) (P4/P3) 
Variables 
ASST 0.12E-7 0.12E-7 0.95E-8 0 -0.25E-8 -0.25E-8 
(0.56) (0.63) (-0.37) (0) (-0.07) (-0.66) 
OWNR -0.06 -0.18 -0.29 -0.12 -0.25 -0.11 
(-0.38) (-1.32) (-1.92)* (-1.92)* (-1.36) (-0.67) 
NWBS -0.26 -0.32 -0.25 0.06 0.01 0.07 
(-1.43) (-1.93)* (-1.24) (0.32) (0.04) (0.34) 
PRDC -0.04 0.13 0.29 0.17 0.33 0.16 
(-0.19) (0.69) (1.36) (0.76) (1.34) (0.69) 
CMRC -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 0.13 0 -0.13 
(-0.65) (-0.09) (-0.57) (0.51) (0) (-0.46) 
SRVC -0.35 -0.04 -0.32 0.31 0.03 -0.28 
(-1.55) (-0.2) (-1.27) (1.24) (0.1) (-1.03) 
AGR 0.55 -0.07 0.18 -0.62 -0.37 0.25 
(1.78)* (-0.21) (0.47) (-1.52) (-0.93) (0.59) 
COAST -0.02 -0.21 -0.11 -0.19 -0.09 0.09 
(-0.16) (-1.89)* (-0.87) (-1.36) (-0.58) (0.64) 
CSTMR -0.03 0.06 0.66 0.09 0.65 0.60 
(-0.18) (0.39) (2.58)** (0.46) (2.47)** (2.18)** 
YRS -0.06 0.001 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.02 
(-1.73)* (0.06) (0.56) (1.66)* (1.49) (0.5) 
RSKY 0.83 0.13 0.25 -0.69 -0.55 0.12 
(2.16)** (0.67) (1.04) (-1.73)* (-1.29) (0.44) 
TRN 0.74 0.52 0.56 -0.22 -0.18 0.03 
(4.94)** (4.36)** (3.77)** (-1.29) (-0.94) (0.18) 
AGE -0.01 -0.02 -0.003 -0.01 0.005 0.01 
(-0.66) (-1.58) (-0.24) (-1.0) (0.35) (0.6) 
EDUC -0.05 0.21 -0.29 0.26 -0.24 -0.51 
(-0.39) (1.79)* (-2.01)** (1.74)* (-1.39) (-3.27)** 
HOF 0.04 0.66 0.25 0.62 0.21 -0.41 
(0.26) (4.5)** (1.54) (3.56)** (1.09) (-2.19)** 
MALE -0.06 -0.35 -0.06 -0.29 0 029 
(-0.39) (-2.51)** (-0.36) (-1.72)* (0) (1.6) 
Probabilities: (Pl) Non-Applicants; (P2) Rejected applicants; (P3) Unsatisfied Borrowers; 
(P4) Satisfied Borrowers. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
* Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant ar 5 percent level. 
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TABLE 4. 
PROBABILITIES FOR A TYPICAL MICROENTREPRENEUR TO BE IN EACH 
CATEGORY 
Sector Non- Quantity Loan size Satisfied Total 
Applicants Rationed Rationed Borrowers 
Applicants Borrowers 
FEMAl.E PRDC 54.2 0.6 41.3 3.8 100 
CMRC 58.4 0.6 38.3 2.7 100 
SRVC 59.2 0.5 38.0 2.3 100 
AGR 58.5 1.2 36.5 3.7 100 
MALE PRDC 69.1 0.7 25.9 4.3 100 
CMRC 72.9 0.6 23.5 2.9 100 
SRVC 73.7 0.5 23.3 2.5 100 
AGR 72.4 1.3 22.2 4.1 100 
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